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Abstract	
	
Radio	occupied	multiple	broadcast,	diplomatic	and	cultural	terrains	during	the	
course	of	the	Hungarian	uprising.	Broadcasters,	and	the	authorities	that	stood	
behind	them	on	both	sides	of	the	Iron	Curtain	mapped,	interpreted	and,	at	times,	
appeared	to	direct	the	course	of	events	on	the	ground.	The	BBC	Monitoring	
Service	Transcription	Collection	offers	a	vital	and	unexplored	perspective	on	
developments	on	the	ground	during	the	Hungarian	uprising,	in	the	context	of	the	
wider	political	warfare	battle	of	the	cold	war.	
	
	
	
Introduction	
	
Listening	is	an	acquired	skill:	as	an	emotional	capacity	and	as	a	set	of	
institutional	practices.	In	the	field	of	radio	broadcasting,	where	much	historical	
analysis	has	focused	on	transmission	rather	than	reception,	it	is	a	particularly	
important	one.	Attentive	listening,	by	audiences	to	programmes	and	by	
programme-makers	to	audiences,	reflects	a	dualism	inherent	to	broadcasting	by	
radio	waves.	Yet,	there	is	an	additional	listening	relationship	that	has	
underpinned	the	conduct	of	international	broadcasting	for	the	last	eighty	years,	
but	which	has	received	little	critical	attention:	the	monitoring	of	broadcast	
output	by	competitor	media	and	state	actors.		
	
From	the	quotidian	to	the	exceptional,	monitoring	as	a	form	of	open	source	
communications	intelligence	became	a	corollary	to	international	broadcasting	
from	the	mid-Twentieth	Century	onwards.	Reflecting	the	explosion	in	the	scale	
and	linguistic	range	of	broadcasting	during	the	Second	World	War,	monitoring	
operations	offered	governments	and	their	broadcasters	the	opportunity	to	tune	
in	to	the	propaganda	battle	and	respond	accordingly.	As	a	strategic	tool	and	as	a	
tactical	weapon,	the	value	of	monitoring	to	broadcasters	(for	programme	making	
and	understanding	audience	media	ecologies)	and	to	governments	(for	policy-
making	and	defence	planning)	bound	their	interests	together.	By	the	autumn	of	
1956,	when	public	protest	led	to	armed	rebellion	in	Hungary,	monitoring	
operations	in	the	United	Kingdom,	conducted	by	the	BBC,	had	become	an	
integral	part	of	Britain’s	cold	war	information	machinery.	And	during	the	crisis	
that	followed,	it	played	a	central	role	in	guiding	Britain’s	broadcast	and	
diplomatic	responses	on	the	international	stage.		
	
The	Hungarian	uprising	was	headline	news	across	the	world,	vying	for	attention	
with	the	unfolding	events	on	the	Suez	Canal	in	Egypt.	From	the	mass	marches	in	
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Budapest	on	Tuesday	23rd	October	and	the	subsequent	reformation	of	the	
Hungarian	government	under	the	rehabilitated	Imre	Nagy,	to	its	brutal	
suppression	by	the	Soviet	military	less	than	two	weeks	later,	news	from	and	
about	Hungary	had	a	potent	appeal	for	audiences	around	the	globe.	As	the	
historian	Eric	Hobsbawm	later	remarked,	‘probably	no	other	episode	in	20th	
Century	history	generated	a	more	intense	burst	of	feeling’.i		
	
The	uprising	was	a	heavily	reported	event,	but	it	was	also	a	distinctly	mediated	
one,	specifically	in	relation	to	radio.	“Freedom"	radio	stations	emerged	during	
the	uprising,	adding	to	the	politics	of	dissent	on	the	airwaves.	But	it	was	Radio	
Budapest	that	was	at	the	centre	of	the	radio	revolution,	mapping	the	course	of	
the	uprising	from	a	Hungarian	perspective.	It	was	on	these	state-controlled	
wavelengths	that	the	news	was	relayed	at	four	thirty	on	the	morning	of	24th	
October	that	‘Fascist	reactionary	elements	have	launched	an	armed	attack	
against	our	public	buildings	and	have	attacked	our	armed	formations’.ii	And	it	
was	from	this	station,	now	under	the	influence	of	a	new	radical	government	that	
just	before	dawn	on	the	morning	of	4th	November	Premier	Imre	Nagy	informed	
listeners	that,	‘In	the	early	hours	of	this	morning,	the	Soviet	troops	launched	an	
attack	against	our	Capital	with	the	obvious	intention	of	overthrowing	the	lawful,	
democratic,	Hungarian	Government.	Our	troops	are	fighting.	The	Government	is	
in	its	place.	I	inform	of	this	the	people	of	the	country	and	world	public	opinion.’iii	
Shortly	after	sunrise,	however,	the	station	fell	silent	as	Soviet	forces	asserted	
control.	
	
Radio	Budapest	was	one	of	a	number	of	broadcasters	competing	on	the	airwaves	
to	get	their	version	of	events	heard	over	the	tumult.	The	BBC	External	Services	
(today’s	BBC	World	Service),	Radio	Moscow,	Voice	of	America	and	Radio	Free	
Europe	were	key	participants	in	the	wider	soundscape	that	framed	the	
discursive	terms	in	which	events	on	the	ground	were	interpreted.	As	an	
information	service	detailing	the	course	of	the	uprising,	as	a	diplomatic	service	
mediating	between	governments	in	Budapest,	London,	Washington	and	Moscow,	
and	as	a	propaganda	service	imbued	with	ideological	essentialism,	radio	was	a	
functionally	integral	part	of	the	Hungarian	uprising.		
	
The	reason	we	know	this	is	because	the	broadcasts	were	monitored	and,	in	many	
cases,	transcribed	verbatim,	albeit	in	translation.	This	is	the	case	in	the	BBC	
Monitoring	Service	Transcription	Collection,	which	forms	the	primary	evidential	
basis	of	this	article.	Covering	the	period	from	the	start	of	the	BBC’s	Monitoring	
Service		(BBCM)	in	1939	to	around	1982,	the	collection	contains	an	estimated	
fifteen	million	pages	of	predominantly	typed	and	handwritten	transcripts	
documenting	broadcast	output	from	around	the	world	during	the	Second	World	
War	and	the	Cold	War.	Monitoring	also	involved	the	translation	of	broadcast	
material	from	the	original	broadcast	language	into	English,	for	the	benefit	of	
BBCM’s	internal	customers	in	BBC	News,	Current	Affairs	and	the	World	Service,	
as	well	as	its	external	partners	in	the	British	government	and	the	American	
Foreign	Broadcast	Information	Service	(FBIS).	As	a	consequence,	the	translation	
of	culture	as	well	as	of	language	was	a	significant	part	of	the	monitor’s	work.	
When	this	tasked	proved	particularly	difficult,	untranslated	worlds	and	phrases	
were	transcribed,	often	with	an	explanatory	note,	to	add	provenance	to	the	
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monitored	interpretation.	And	it	was	at	this	granular	level	of	detail	that	the	
Transcription	Collection	is	at	its	most	potent	in	terms	of	its	historical	
significance.	Unlike	BBCM’s	Summary	of	World	Broadcasts	publication,	which	
shaped	and	condensed	the	monitoring	product	to	the	requirements	of	its	
stakeholders,	the	transcripts	reveal	a	much	richer	and	versatile	resource.iv	
	
In	its	pages,	the	Collection	details	grand	narratives	alongside	the	minutiae	of	
daily	life	across	political,	economic,	diplomatic,	cultural,	developmental,	trade,	
decolonisation	and	countless	other	themes.	Deposited	with	the	Imperial	War	
Museum	from	the	1960s	until	2016	and	now	back	at	the	BBC,	the	Collection	has	
been	largely	ignored	as	an	academic	source	and	remains	a	hidden	gem.	In	
practice,	it	represents	an	untapped	and	hugely	significant	resource	for	reading	
the	past	in	real-time.	It	is	the	purpose	of	this	article	to	examine	the	role	of	
monitoring	during	the	Hungarian	uprising	in	order	to	suggest	where	the	
collection	can	make	a	particular	contribution	both	in	terms	of	the	insight	its	
delivers	into	the	specific	events	of	1956	as	well	as	how	monitoring	operates	as	
an	analytical	discipline	and	its	wider	historical	salience.	
	
	
Intelligent	Listening	
	
Broadcasting	is	ethereal,	an	activity	that	literally	disappears	into	the	air:	
vibrations	that	animate,	but	which	leave	little	or	no	physical	trace	behind.	In	this	
respect,	the	power	of	radio	is	as	much	sensual	as	it	is	political	or	social.	The	
affective	influence	of	radio	in	the	mid	1950s	was	difficult	to	measure,	however.	
In	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	on	the	other	side	of	the	Iron	Curtain,	audience	
research	was	not	a	readily	available	tool	for	western	broadcasters	and	
governments	who	were	left	with	little	hard	evidence	of	the	impact	they	were	
having.	Moreover,	there	were	problems	with	even	knowing	what	was	broadcast.	
At	this	time,	recordings	of	original	output	were	almost	never	kept,	especially	
international	programmes,	for	reasons	of	inclination	as	well	as	cost.	Likewise,	
scripts	are	few	and	far	between.	Where	they	do	exist	it	can	be	difficult	to	tell	if	
they	were	“as	broadcast”.	By	way	of	contrast,	monitoring	apprehends	the	
ethereal	and	makes	it	material,	albeit	with	attendant	technological	and	human	
capacities	for	distortion	at	the	point	of	capture.	More	than	just	tuning	in	and	
transcribing,	it	is	an	act	of	intelligent	listening,	which	uses	the	experience	and	
skill	of	the	monitor	to	identify	salience	and,	at	critical	junctures,	deviations	from	
the	norm.	As	radio	waves	made	concrete,	monitoring	draws	sound	into	renewed	
dialogue	with	our	historical	reconstructions	of	the	past.v	
	
By	detailing	the	media	landscape	of	the	everyday,	the	transcripts	of	the	BBC	
Monitoring	Service	Transcription	Collection	also	contribute	to	our	
understanding	of	the	lived	experience	of	listeners.	How	people	listened	gives	us	
insight	into	the	world	around	them.	For	example,	at	twenty	to	eleven	on	24th	
October	1956,	the	morning	after	the	armed	insurrection	had	begun,	Radio	
Budapest’s	domestic	service	made	an	unusual	appeal:		
	
Attention.	Attention.	We	request	listeners	to	place	their	wireless	
receivers	into	the	windows	as	we	are	shortly	to	make	important	
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announcements.	In	a	short	time	we	will	be	broadcasting	a	speech	
by	Premier	Imre	Nagy.vi	
	
This	was	the	first	of	many	similar	appeals	over	the	next	few	days	to	use	radio	as	
a	public	messaging	service,	both	in	the	house	and	on	the	streets.	It	paints	a	vivid	
scene	of	loudspeakers	on	the	windowsills	of	Budapest	echoing	to	the	sound	of	
revolution.	It	also	usefully	demonstrates	the	way	in	which	radio	was	clearly	
understood	by	politicians,	the	military,	broadcasters	and	listeners	alike	to	have	a	
central	role	in	the	conduct	of	the	uprising.	When	Nagy	took	to	the	microphone	an	
hour	and	a	half	later,	it	was	to	announce	“that	all	those	who	in	the	interests	of	
avoiding	further	bloodshed	stop	fighting	before	14:00	today	and	lay	down	their	
arms	will	be	exempted	from	summary	jurisdiction”	and	that	comrades	should	
“Trust,	that	learning	from	the	mistakes	of	the	past,	we	will	find	the	correct	road	
for	the	prosperity	of	our	country”.vii	His	speech	was	followed	by	the	national	
anthem.		
	
These	details	offer	us,	in	the	present,	a	glimpse	of	the	living	past.	The	transcripts	
allow	us	to	read	back	into	history	in	a	very	direct	way	and	to	observe	its	
fluctuations	in	something	close	to	real-time.	Nagy’s	request	for	calm	and	his	
initial	appetite	for	piecemeal	reform	was	replaced	within	little	over	a	week	with	
the	reintroduction	of	a	multi-party	system,	a	declaration	of	‘the	neutrality	of	the	
Hungarian	People’s	Republic’	and	a	claim	of	effective	independence	from	Soviet	
influence.viii	In	the	intervening	period	the	transcripts	show	how,	minute-by-
minute	and	hour-by-hour,	the	course	of	the	uprising	flowed	and	how	pivotal	
figures	such	as	Nagy	were	carried	forward	by	the	tidal	wave	of	revolutionary	
passion.	As	such,	it	adds	richness,	depth	and	a	sense	of	immediacy	to	the	
historical	record.	
	
The	BBC	Monitoring	Service	has	always	been	greatly	valued	by	its	broadcasting	
and	government	customers	for	often	being	first	with	vital	breaking	news.	This	
was	dramatically	illustrated,	for	example,	when	at	the	height	of	the	Cuban	
missile	crisis	and	with	the	British	Prime	Minister,	Harold	Macmillan,	poised	to	
instigate	the	‘Precautionary	Stage’	(Britain’s	military	preparations	for	
thermonuclear	war),	BBC	Monitoring	reported	Nikita	Khrushchev’s	broadcast	in	
which	he	ordered	‘the	dismantlement	of	the	weapons	[on	Cuba],	which	you	
describe	as	offensive,	their	packing	and	their	return	to	the	Soviet	Union’.ix	But	
the	BBC’s	monitors	offered	far	more	than	the	services	of	a	news	agency.		
	
As	can	be	seen	from	the	transcripts	in	the	archive,	BBC	Monitoring	operated	at	a	
number	of	simultaneous	scales	of	enquiry	and	intelligence.	The	ability	to	bear	
down	in	considerable	detail	on	unfolding	events	while	also	placing	them	in	a	
wider	constellation	of	regional	and	global	events	was	one	of	the	most	valuable	
and	critical	features	of	monitoring.	It	is	also	a	profoundly	important	analytical	
attribute	for	modern	day	researchers	using	the	archive.	Much	has	recently	been	
made	of	the	concept	of	the	historian’s	macroscope:	the	capacity	for	close	and	
distant	reading	of	texts	and	data	at	the	same	time.x	However,	the	BBC	Monitoring	
Service	has	been	using	this	multivariate	optic	in	its	media	analysis	for	the	last	
eight	decades.		
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At	the	granular	level	of	focus	it	is	possible	to	isolate	and	explore	how	nuances	in	
the	language,	scheduling	and	editing	of	monitored	communications	reveal	the	
attitudes,	stresses	and	the	strategic	and/or	tactical	concerns	at	play	at	the	
moment	of	broadcast.	The	unscheduled	appearance	of	‘recorded	chamber	music’	
on	the	Budapest	Home	Service	in	the	early	hours	of	24th	October	1956,	for	
example,	immediately	indicated	to	monitors	that	not	only	was	something	truly	
dramatic	taking	place,	but	that	the	authorities	did	not	yet	appear	to	be	in	control	
of	the	situation.xi	Just	as	importantly,	knowing	what	is	missing	from	broadcast	
output,	the	absence	of	a	news	bulletin	or	speech,xii	which	is	only	detectable	
through	attentive	listening	over	the	longue	durée,	can	also	capture	the	
significance	of	the	moment.		
	
Through	a	wider	lens	it	is	possible	to	view	events	from	a	number	of	geographic	
and	temporal	perspectives.	Soviet	allegations	that	the	aggressive	and	subversive	
tactics	of	the	imperialist	powers	(America	and	the	United	Kingdom	in	particular)	
had	led	to	the	undermining	of	Hungarian	socialism	and	had	incited	Hungarian	
citizens	to	violence	played	directly	into	the	narrative	of	the	uprising	and	its	
aftermath.	So	too	did	the	Soviet	and	other	communist	countries’	analysis	of	the	
contemporaneous	military	incursions	of	Israel,	Britain	and	France	in	Egypt,	
which	was	used	to	demonstrate	the	destabilising	and	pernicious	unreliability	of	
the	Western	alliance.	Meanwhile,	the	demand	at	the	start	of	the	protests	in	
Budapest	that	‘comrade	Imre	Nagy	be	reinstated’xiii	to	government	was	as	much	
about	the	events	of	1953,	when	he	was	deposed	from	the	leadership	in	favour	of	
the	hardliner	Matyos	Rakosi	and	the	sense	of	democratic	loss	experienced	then,	
as	it	was	about	his	present	suitability	for	government.	However,	without	an	
understanding	of	that	historical	echo,	which	monitors	clearly	had,	the	
subsequent	interpretation	of	current	events	would	have	lacked	a	critical	part	of	
their	meaning.	
	
The	existence,	in	various	states	of	accessibility,	of	other	monitoring	archives	
around	the	world	–	in	the	UK,	US,	Russia	and	Hungary,	for	example	–	suggests	the	
promise,	not	yet	realised,	of	a	much	richer	resource	of	monitoring	archives	that	if	
combined	could	provide	a	multi-perspectival	analytical	framework	and	
methodology	for	examining	our	mediated	lives.	It	is	evident,	however,	that	to	do	
this	requires	an	interdisciplinary	academic	approach.	The	science	and	
technology	of	monitoring	needs	to	be	read	alongside	its	history	and	sociology	as	
well	as	its	cultural	and	political	impact.	As	it	is,	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	
Transcription	Collection,	which	is	the	focus	of	this	study,	is	a	meeting	point	for	a	
number	of	academic	disciplines	of	analysis,	reflecting	the	far	reaching	nature	of	
its	activities.	
	
	
Communications	Intelligence	
	
Monitoring	at	the	BBC	had	begun	in	tandem	with	the	launch	of	the	Corporation’s	
first	overseas	language	service	in	Arabic	in	January	1938.xiv	As	foreign	language	
broadcasting	at	the	BBC	expanded	over	the	coming	year	and	a	half,	so	too	did	the	
Corporation’s	ad	hoc	monitoring	operations.	But	it	was	only	on	the	eve	of	the	
outbreak	of	the	Second	World	War	that	a	distinct	Monitoring	Service	was	
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formally	established	within	the	BBC	structure,	initially	located	at	the	BBC’s	
evacuation	centre	at	Wood	Norton,	Worcestershire,	before	moving	in	1943	to	its	
current	home	at	Caversham	in	Berkshire.	Born	out	of	the	necessity	to	know	what	
competitor	nations	and	broadcasters	were	saying	in	their	mass	media	
communications,	monitoring	served	the	needs	of	both	BBC	broadcasters	and	the	
British	government	in	offering	up-to-date	open	source	intelligence.	
	
The	explosion	in	international	broadcasting	brought	about	by	the	war	
necessitated	monitoring	on	a	very	large	scale.	By	the	middle	of	the	war	over	
30,000	words	in	‘flash	messages’,	those	of	utmost	importance,	were	being	
relayed	daily	to	government	departments	by	teleprinter,	out	of	the	one	and	half	
million	words	in	thirty-two	languages	listened	to	every	day.xv	The	global	
information	battle	was	on	the	front-line	of	the	Second	World	War	and	it	ensured	
that	monitoring	became	an	embedded	practice	in	the	defence	of	the	realm	and	in	
the	production	of	programmes.	The	war	proved	the	value	of	Monitoring:	to	the	
government,	who	saw	it	as	an	essential	source	of	intelligence;	and	to	the	BBC	
through	the	increasing	use	made	by	its	various	branches	of	monitored	material.	
	
The	postwar	planning	assumption	had	been	that	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	
would	be	considerably	reduced	once	the	imperatives	of	conflict	had	subsided.	
However,	for	both	the	BBC	and	its	government	customers,	monitoring	was	too	
vital	a	source	to	give	up,	especially	as	hot	war	with	Germany	and	her	allies	gave	
way	to	a	cold	war	with	the	Soviet	Union	and	its	sphere	of	influence.	In	practical	
terms,	the	BBC	had	come	to	rely	on	monitoring,	particularly	in	its	External	
Services	broadcasts	overseas.	As	the	BBC	Director-General	William	Haley	noted	
at	the	end	of	1945,	the	‘monitoring	service	obtained	from	the	news	agencies	was	
so	inadequate	and	at	times	inaccurate,	that	the	BBC	would	have	either	to	cease	
quoting	foreign	broadcasts	or	to	continue	monitoring	for	itself’.xvi	Meanwhile	in	
Whitehall,	the	value	derived	from	monitoring	had	been	recognised	across	a	wide	
range	of	government	business.	Foreign	and	diplomatic	affairs,	military	and	
defence	planning,	propaganda	and	psychological	warfare	strategies,	and	the	
intelligence	services,	all	benefitted	hugely	from	access	not	just	to	the	monitoring	
product,	but	also	to	the	skillset	and	experience	of	the	monitors	that	produced	it.	
This	was	underwritten	by	government	funding	of	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	
through	Foreign	Office	Grant-in-Aid	as,	indeed,	were	the	BBC	External	Services.	
And	by	1948,	the	government’s	Joint	Intelligence	Committee,	the	coordinating	
nexus	of	the	UK’s	intelligence	machinery,	established	a	Sub-Committee	on	
Monitoring	Requirements	to	facilitate	the	requirements	of	Britain’s	intelligence	
services.xvii		
	
The	creation,	also	in	1948,	of	the	rather	blandly	titled	Information	Research	
Department	(IRD)	within	the	Foreign	Office	plugged	the	Monitoring	Service	into	
the	heart	of	the	government’s	covert	propaganda	operations.	Initially	designed	
‘to	collect	information	concerning	Communist	policy,	tactics	and	propaganda	and	
to	provide	material	for	our	anti-Communist	publicity’,xviii	IRD	relied	on	
monitoring	output.	This	was	particularly	true	in	relation	to	the	Foreign	Office’s	
internal	‘Trends	in	Communist	Propaganda’	publication	that	guided	the	work	of	
IRD	and	was	largely	based	on	the	information	provided	by	monitoring.	In	a	
similar	way,	the	Monitoring	Service	also	channelled	data	on	the	history	and	
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development	of	communist	movements	around	the	world	into	a	little	known	
BBC	department:	the	Central	Research	Unit	(CRU),	led	by	Walter	Kolarz.	During	
the	Hungarian	uprising,	CRU	was	to	prove	invaluable	as	an	institutional	memory-
bank	that,	among	other	things,	contained	‘the	names	and	careers	of	every	
insignificant	Under-Secretary	and	most	of	the	Communist	Party	functionaries,	
dating	back	to	1945’.	As	the	Head	of	the	BBC	Hungarian	Service	in	1956,	Ferenc	
Rentoul,	noted,	this	‘self-contained	information	bureau	……	paid	rich	dividends	
when	the	slow-moving	events	of	the	Cold	War	years	suddenly	burst	into	a	full	
national	revolution’.xix	
	
Central	though	the	BBC	and	the	British	government	were	to	the	practice,	tasking	
and	funding	of	the	Monitoring	Service,	the	arrival	of	American	monitors	from	
1941	opened	up	a	transatlantic	open	source	intelligence	relationship	between	
the	BBC	and	United	States	that	continues	to	this	day.	As	the	Senior	Supervisor	of	
the	Information	Bureau	at	Monitoring,	Frank	Benton,	noted	in	his	logbook	at	the	
time:	‘Four	Americans,	members	of	the	American	Monitoring	service,	are	coming	
to	Wood	Norton	some	time	this	week	to	start	a	sort	of	European	outpost	for	their	
service.	They	propose	to	send	home	by	transatlantic	telephone,	three	times	
every	24	hours,	a	précis	of	material	put	out	by	European	stations	which	are	
normally	inaudible	in	the	United	States.’xx	The	reach	of	the	combined	British	and	
American	monitoring	operations	was	global	and	extremely	useful	to	both	
governments	on	reciprocal	terms.	After	the	war,	an	American	editorial	team	was	
maintained	at	Caversham	for	the	supply	of	‘up	to	20,000	words	of	BBC	material	
by	telegraph	to	Washington	every	day.’xxi	By	the	Spring	of	1948,	two	years	after	
the	signing	of	the	UKUSA	Security	Agreement	on	sharing	signals	intelligence	
(Sigint)	between	Britain	and	America,	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	and	the	US	
Foreign	Broadcast	Information	Service	(FBIS)	agreed	to	‘the	dove-tailing	of	the	
monitoring	operations	of	the	two	countries	so	as	to	avoid	duplication	as	far	as	
possible,	and	for	the	complete	pooling	of	the	intercepted	material’.xxii	To	this	
extent,	the	BBC	Monitoring	Services	was	embedded	from	the	beginning	in	the	
special	intelligence	between	Britain	and	America.xxiii	
	
By	the	time	of	the	Hungarian	uprising	in	1956,	this	relationship	was	well	
established	with	both	British	and	American	authorities	and	broadcasters	waiting	
on	every	‘flash’	and	‘snap’	of	breaking	news	that	was	picked	up	at	Caversham.	In	
the	case	of	the	BBC	Hungarian	Section,	broadcasting	into	Hungary	during	the	
uprising,	their	dependence	on	monitoring	was	vital.	So	much	so	that	following	
the	example	of	the	Polish	Section	during	the	Poznan	riots	in	June	1956,	a	direct	
line	from	the	Monitoring	Service	was	fed	into	Bush	House	in	London,	the	home	of	
the	External	Services,	for	the	benefit	of	the	Hungarian	Section	staff.	Here,	
monitoring	and	broadcasting	came	full	circle	as	BBC	journalists	listened	intently	
to	the	output	of	Radio	Budapest	(as	their	principal	source	of	news)	in	order	to	
frame	the	BBC’s	narrative	of	events,	which	was	then	broadcast	back	into	
Hungary.	Reflecting	on	listening	to	these	broadcasts	in	the	early	hours	of	
Wednesday	24th	October	the	Assistant	Head	of	Central	European	Services	at	the	
BBC,	George	Tarjan,	later	recalled	hearing	‘untrained	voices	making	sporadic,	
hasty	announcements	on	the	wavelength	.	.	.	we	knew	then	that	the	Communist	
Government	had	lost	control	of	the	situation	despite	seemingly	confident	
statements	about	people	laying	down	their	arms’.xxiv	Moreover,	he	continued,	‘we	
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felt	that	only	by	listening	ourselves	to	Radio	Budapest	could	we	get	near	enough	
to	the	atmosphere	in	the	Hungarian	capital	to	gauge	what	events	really	meant’.xxv	
In	these	moments,	listening	was	the	genesis	for	broadcasting.		
	
	
Narratives	
	
The	historical	narrative	of	the	Hungarian	uprising	has,	in	the	past,	been	a	hotly	
contested	topic,	reflecting	the	political	and	ideological	imperatives	at	play.	This	
was	most	evident	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	uprising,	resulting	in	the	
setting	up	of	a	‘Special	Committee	on	the	Problem	of	Hungary’	at	the	United	
Nations.	In	its	deliberations	on	the	causes	of	the	uprising	the	committee	relied	
heavily	on	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service’s	Summary	of	World	Broadcasts	and	FBIS’	
Daily	Reports,	reflecting	their	value	as	historical	documents.	The	committee	
found	that	in	a	country	where	the	government	was	‘maintained	by	the	weapon	of	
terror’	and	the	Soviet	Union	was	‘an	alien	influence	[that]	existed	in	all	walks	of	
life’,	what	happened	in	Hungary	was	‘a	spontaneous	national	uprising,	caused	by	
longstanding	grievances’.xxvi	
	
These	grievances	had	been	building	for	some	time	in	both	Poland	and	Hungary,	
with	events	in	those	countries	loosely	mirroring	each	other	right	up	to	the	
student	march	through	the	streets	of	Budapest	on	23rd	October	1956.	Civil	
society	in	both	had,	over	the	previous	months,	been	agitating	for	political,	
economic,	cultural	and	democratic	reforms.	The	dramatic	events	of	the	
Twentieth	Congress	of	the	Communist	Party	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	February	
1956,	where	Khrushchev	had	denounced	the	mistakes	of	Joseph	Stalin	and	the	
“cult	of	personality”	that	surrounded	him,	set	an	entirely	new	precedent	for	
legitimate	discourse	in	the	communist	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	–	
that	of	self-criticism.	But	what	would	be	the	effect	of	this	radical	volte-face	in	the	
governing	logic	of	the	satellite	states?	As	Ferenc	Rentoul	put	it	in	a	General	News	
Talk	for	the	European	Services	in	June	that	year:	‘Like	the	sorcerer’s	apprentice	
who	had	released	forces	he	could	not	later	control,	the	Communist	regimes	of	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe	are	in	difficulties.’xxvii	
	
The	riots	at	the	Cegielski	engineering	works	in	Poznan,	Poland,	in	June	1956	and	
the	accompanying	demand	for	“Bread	and	Freedom”	had	indicated	where	this	
might	lead.	But	the	return	to	power	of	Wladyslaw	Gomulka	with	a	popular	
reforming	agenda	on	the	one	hand,	while	facing	down	the	threat	from	Moscow	to	
intervene	militarily	on	the	other,	miraculously	succeeded	in	diluting	
revolutionary	fervour.	On	20	October	1956	he	was	appointed	First	Secretary	of	
the	Polish	United	Workers’	Party.	His	success	was	celebrated	in	Hungary	where,	
over	the	next	couple	of	days,	intense	public	debate	ensued	in	the	universities,	
factories,	among	the	intelligentsia	and	on	the	streets,	resulting	in	an	agenda	for	
change	and	a	public	appetite	to	pursue	it.		
	
Throughout	the	evening	of	Monday	22nd	October,	Radio	Budapest	reported	on	
the	‘extraordinary’	university	student	meetings,	inspired	by	the	events	in	Poland,	
at	which	lists	of	reforming	demands	were	produced	and	plans	made	for	a	public	
march	through	Budapest	the	next	day.	Following	this	lead,	other	civil	society	
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groups,	such	as	the	Petofi	Circle	of	the	Union	of	Working	Youth,	the	Union	of	
Journalists	and	the	Hungarian	Writers’	Union,	met	to	support	the	student	
initiative	and	produce	their	own	demands.	There	was	a	clear	sense,	for	anyone	
listening,	that	a	palpable	momentum	for	change	was	building.	What’s	more,	by	
being	reported	so	openly	in	domestic	media	the	impression	of	implicit,	if	limited,	
acceptance	by	the	Hungarian	authorities	was	given.	The	next	day’s	edition	of	
Szabad	Nep,	the	Hungarian	Workers’	Party	newspaper,	even	led	with	the	
headline,	“New	Spring-like	Review	of	Youth”.	Meanwhile,	Radio	Budapest’s	7am	
news	bulletin	on	23rd	October	examined	in	detail	the	events	of	the	previous	
evening	and	the	demands	of	the	university	students,	who	‘have	given	proof	of	
their	constructive	enthusiasm’:	
	
We,	who	have	turned	against	the	crimes	and	mistakes	committed	
in	the	immediate	past,	want	to	side	with	the	collective	action	of	
youth	not	only	with	words,	but	also	by	deeds	and	with	all	the	
possibilities	of	material	and	moral	support	…	…	We,	therefore,	are	
in	agreement	with	the	demands	of	youth.	Indeed,	we	not	only	
agree	with	them,	but	shall	fight	for	them	in	our	own	field	and	to	
realize	them.xxviii	
	
Despite	this,	there	was	evidence	that	the	Hungarian	authorities	were	still	
uncertain	about	which	course	of	action	to	take.	This	was	the	case	with	the	initial	
imposition	of	a	ban	on	all	open-air	rallies	and	demonstrations	on	23rd	October,	
only	for	this	ban	itself	to	be	overturned	by	the	Minister	of	the	Interior,	Laszlo	
Piros,	in	the	early	afternoon.xxix	By	this	time,	however,	the	student	demonstration	
was	under	way.	Workers	returning	home	at	the	end	of	the	day	also	joined	the	
students,	so	that	by	the	time	they	reached	Parliament	Square	in	the	early	evening	
the	crowd	numbered	in	excess	of	200,000	people.		
	
If	the	Hungarian	government	had	appeared	uncertain	at	this	critical	juncture,	it	
was	perhaps	because	its	leader,	Erno	Gero,	had	been	away	on	an	official	visit	to	
Yugoslavia.	His	return	that	day	was	marked	by	a	speech	broadcast	on	Radio	
Budapest	at	8pm,	the	offices	of	which	were	surrounded	by	thousands	of	
determined	protestors,	in	an	off-shoot	from	the	main	march.	It	was	a	curious	
speech	that	failed	to	match	the	sentiment	of	those	on	the	streets.	While	admitting	
the	‘numerous	mistakes	of	the	past’	he	argued	that	the	government	was	indeed	
taking	action,	but	that	gradual	reform	was	needed	to	avoid	making	further	
mistakes:	‘Let	us	proceed	more	slowly’.	This	was	an	error	of	judgment	on	the	
part	of	Gero	that	would	have	done	little	to	placate	the	growing	public	militancy	
for	radical	reform.	Gero	did	not	stop	there,	however,	and	proceeded	to	denounce	
‘the	enemies	of	our	people’	who,	
	
heap	slanders	on	the	Soviet	Union	…	…	that	our	relations	to	the	
Soviet	Union	allegedly	is	not	that	of	equality	and	that	our	
independence	must	be	defended	allegedly	not	against	the	
imperialists	but	against	the	Soviet	Union.	All	this	is	impudent	
untruth,	hostile	propaganda	which	does	not	contain	a	grain	of	
truth.xxx	
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As	this	had	been	a	core	criticism	of	the	protestors,	it	would	have	been	
interpreted	as	a	denunciation	of	them.	Moreover,	Gero	proceeded	to	
‘condemn	those	who	strive	to	spread	the	poison	of	chauvinism	among	
our	youth	and	who	have	taken	advantage	of	the	democratic	freedom	
ensured	by	our	State	to	the	working	people	to	carry	out	demonstration	of	
nationalistic	character’.xxxi	For	the	BBC’s	George	Mikes,	who	arrived	in	
Budapest	a	few	days	later,	‘it	was	this	speech	that	pulled	the	trigger’	on	
the	uprising.xxxii	
	
As	has	already	been	shown,	the	first	acknowledgment	of	an	armed	revolt	came	at	
4:30am	on	Wednesday	24th	October.	And	what	followed	on	Radio	Budapest	in	
the	first	hours	of	the	uprising	was	a	somewhat	fractured	narrative	that	reflected	
the	uncertainty	of	unfolding	events.	
	
xxxiii	
Fig.1:	Note	on	the	behaviour	of	Radio	Budapest,	9:30am,	24th	October	1956	
	
The	radio	station	entered	a	holding	pattern,	as	can	be	seen	in	Fig.1,	while	the	
Hungarian	government	worked	out	its	response.	In	the	meantime,	the	normal	
schedule	of	programmes	was	dispensed	with	in	favour	of	chamber	music,	
followed	by	opera	arias,	interspersed	with	public	announcements,	which	were	
interesting	in	themselves.xxxiv	For	example,	in	a	repeat	an	hour	after	the	original	
announcement	concerning	that	start	of	hostilities,	the	term	“Fascist	reactionary	
elements”	was	replaced	by	“Counter-revolutionary	reactionary	elements”.xxxv	
Half	an	hour	later,	listeners	were	advised	not	to	go	out	on	the	streets	unless	it	
was	an	‘absolute	emergency’	so	as	to	avoid	what	was	described	as	the	‘mopping	
up	(tisztogatas)	of	looting	counter-revolutionary	groups	is	still	in	progress’.xxxvi	
	
At	8:13am	Budapest	Radio	announced	a	reshuffle	in	the	government	with	the	
appointment	of	new	members	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	Hungarian	
Workers’	Party,	including	Imre	Nagy	as	Chairman	of	the	Council	of	Ministers.	
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Gero,	however,	was	to	remain	as	First	Secretary	of	the	Party.	Two	further	
announcements	in	the	following	forty-five	minutes	were	to	be	the	cause	of	
considerable	confusion	both	during	and	after	the	uprising.	The	first,	was	the	
declaration,	explicitly	referenced	as	being	signed	by	Nagy,	that	the	death	penalty	
would	be	applied,	
	
against	acts	designed	to	overthrow	the	People’s	Republic,	revolt,	
incitement,	appeal	and	conspiracy	to	revolt,	murder,	
manslaughter,	arson,	keeping	of	explosives	and	crimes	committed	
by	use	of	explosives,	crimes	indirectly	committed,	force	applied	
against	official	authorities,	force	against	private	persons,	illicit	
possession	of	arms.xxxvii	
	
The	second	concerned	a	request	by	the	Hungarian	government,	under	the	terms	
of	the	Warsaw	Treaty,	for	Soviet	troops	stationed	in	Hungary	to	take	part	in	the	
restoration	of	order.xxxviii	The	implication	was	that	the	use	of	Soviet	force	to	quash	
the	uprising	had	been	done	at	the	request	of	Nagy.	In	fact,	the	request	had	come	
from	Gero,	but	the	seed	of	doubt	this	sowed	was	the	source	of	considerable	
consternation	in	Budapest	and	in	the	minds	of	monitors	that,	in	turn,	fed	wider	
official	and	public	opinion.	
	
Another	feature	of	Radio	Budapest’s	output	on	24th	October	was	the	drip	feed	of	
reports	about	the	supposed	surrender	of	‘counter-revolutionary	groups’,	for	
example,	at	Chain	Bridge	(11:45am),	Baross	Ter	(12:20pm),	and	in	Raday	Street	
(13:01pm).xxxix	The	intended	impression	that	order	was	being	restored	was,	
however,	somewhat	tempered	by	the	multiple	extensions	to	the	original	
amnesty	for	laying	down	weapons	from	midday	to	2pm	and	again	to	6pm.	As	
deadlines	loomed	and	passed,	listeners	were	reminded	they	had	‘minutes	to	go	
……	to	avail	themselves	of	the	magnanimity	of	our	Government	to	escape	
summary	trial	and	the	death	penalty’.xl	These	pleas	for	calm	became	part	of	the	
broadcast	rhythm	of	the	early	uprising:	
	
Working	women,	do	not	let	Budapest	fall	into	the	hands	of	
murderous	provocateurs.	Do	not	let	yourself	be	misled	by	lying	
slanders.	Working	women	do	everything	in	your	power	to	prevent	
your	relatives	from	taking	part,	in	their	own	interest,	in	the	
demonstration	and	rising.xli	
	
They	also	became	increasingly	emotional	and	specific	as	in	the	case	of	the,	
presumably	apocryphal,	broadcast	message	to	the	seventeen-year-old	son	of	Bela	
Tarjan:	
	
His	parents	have	learnt	that	he	has	taken	part	in	the	armed	fight.	
His	mother	has	suffered	a	nervous	breakdown.	Her	condition	is	
serious.	He	is	to	go	home	immediately	if	he	wishes	to	see	his	
mother	alive.xlii	
	
In	its	output,	and	in	the	minds	of	listeners	in	Hungary	and	beyond	(via	the	
headphones	of	monitors	at	the	BBC	in	Caversham),	Radio	Budapest	was	telling	
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two	different	stories:	one	explicit	and	one	implicit.	The	first	was	the	restoration	
of	order	in	the	face	of	imperialist-inspired,	counter-revolutionary	violence.	Janus-
like,	the	reorganised	Hungarian	government	was	attempting	to	indicate	real	
reform	and	change,	with	the	promise	of	more,	for	its	domestic	audience,	while	
signalling	a	reconstituted	strength	of	purpose	to	Moscow.	Implicitly,	however,	a	
lack	of	control	and	sense	of	desperation	was	being	communicated.	And	as	a	
second	night	of	fighting	loomed,	so	the	unsustainability	of	the	Hungarian	
government	became	increasingly	apparent.	
	
As	the	course	of	the	uprising	changed	over	the	following	days	–	reflecting	an	
increasingly	empowered	Nagy	and	growing	equivocation	from	Moscow	–	so	too	
did	the	accompanying	broadcast	narrative.	This	was	most	powerfully	
demonstrated	by	two	broadcasts	on	Tuesday	30th	October,	one	week	after	the	
start	of	the	uprising.	By	this	time	a	new	Hungarian	government	led	by	Nagy,	
including	popular	non-communists	such	as	Zoltan	Tildy	and	Bela	Kovacs,	had	
come	into	being.	The	first,	from	Radio	Budapest,	indicated	the	extent	to	which	
Hungary	was	trying	to	break	from	the	past:	
	
Dear	Listeners!	We	are	opening	a	new	chapter	in	the	history	of	the	
Hungarian	Radio	at	this	hour.	For	long	years	past,	the	radio	was	
an	instrument	of	lies.	It	merely	carried	out	orders.	It	lied	during	
the	night	and	at	daytime,	it	lied	on	all	wavelengths.	.	.	.	We	who	are	
facing	the	microphone	now,	are	new	men.	In	future	you	will	hear	
new	voices	over	the	old	wavelengths.	As	the	old	saying	has	it,	we	
shall	tell	“the	truth,	the	whole	truth,	and	nothing	but	the	truth”.xliii	
	
Meanwhile,	in	a	broadcast	that	evening	described	by	Allen	Dulles,	the	Director	of	
the	CIA,	as	‘one	of	the	most	significant	to	come	out	of	the	Soviet	Union	since	the	
end	of	World	War	Two’,	Radio	Moscow	announced:	
	
the	Soviet	Government	has	given	orders	to	its	military	command	
to	withdraw	the	Soviet	army	units	from	Budapest	as	soon	as	this	
is	considered	necessary	by	the	Hungarian	government.	At	the	
same	time,	the	Soviet	government	is	ready	to	enter	into	
corresponding	negotiations	with	the	government	of	the	
Hungarian	People’s	Republic	and	other	participants	of	the	
Warsaw	Treaty	on	the	question	of	the	presence	of	Soviet	troops	
on	the	territory	of	Hungary.xliv	
	
At	the	point	of	seeming	success,	however,	the	tide	was	turning	against	the	
uprising	as	the	following	day	the	Soviet	leadership	reversed	their	decision	and	
began	the	build-up	of	troops	around	Budapest,	rather	than	their	removal.	
	
The	end	came	on	the	morning	of	Sunday	4th	November	starting	with	that	
dramatic	broadcast	by	Imre	Nagy	at	5:19am	announcing	the	launch	of	a	Soviet	
attack	against	Budapest.xlv	It	was	followed	by	a	repeat	of	Nagy’s	message	the	
previous	day	to	the	Secretary-General	of	the	United	Nations,	Dag	Hammarskjold,	
in	which	he	asked	the	UN	to	uphold	Hungary’s	declaration	of	neutrality	and	
independence	from	the	Warsaw	Pact.xlvi	At	6:44am,	Associated	Press	reported	
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that	the	UN	Security	Council	had	received	the	appeal.xlvii	At	7:12am,	after	the	
playing	of	Schubert’s	Ave	Maria	the	Hungarian	government	sent	a	message	‘to	the	
officers	and	men	of	the	Soviet	Army	not	to	shoot.	Let	us	avoid	the	blood-shed.	The	
Russians	are	our	friends	and	will	remain	our	friends.’	This	was	repeated	
immediately	in	Russian.xlviii	At	7:56am	there	was	a	further	and,	as	it	transpired,	
final	appeal	by	the	Hungarian	Writer’s	Association	‘to	the	writers	of	the	world.	
Help	the	Hungarian	writers,	workers,	peasants,	scientists.	Help.	Help	Hungary.	
Help.’xlix	Soon	afterwards,	Radio	Budapest	fell	silent	until	11am	when	BBC	
monitors	at	Caversham	caught	a	small	fragment	of	speech	on	the	Budapest	
wavelength:	‘…	Counter-revolutionary	elements	have	found	their	way	into	the	
movement	…’l	Hearing	that	phrase	again,	they	knew	that	the	uprising	was	over.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
What	these	examples	from	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	Transcription	Collection	
powerfully	demonstrate	is	the	sheer	pace	and	fluidity	of	events	in	Hungary	at	the	
time	and	the	palpable	uncertainty	about	where	this	was	all	leading.	The	
transcripts	reveal	the	messiness	of	history,	detailing	the	temporal	chaos	of	the	
moment	alongside	the	competing	political,	cultural,	strategic	and	ideological	
influences	at	play.	They	also	offer	an	extraordinary	level	of	detail	and	insight	into	
what	it	was	like	to	live	through	the	Hungarian	uprising.	They	add	richness,	depth	
and	context	to	our	historical	understanding.	
	
More	broadly,	the	Collection	opens	a	window	onto	the	operating	assumptions,	
tactics	and	techniques	of	broadcasters	and	the	governments	and	organisations	
that	stood	behind	them.	In	the	case	of	Radio	Budapest,	one	can	observe	the	
evolution	of	narrative	strategies	as	the	broadcaster	and	the	nation	tried	to	
comprehend	the	course	and	the	meaning	of	unfolding	events.	This	necessarily	
had	to	accommodate	the	radically	shifting	nature	of	governing	Hungarian	
attitudes	and	actions	on	the	home	front,	but	was	also	calculated	to	appeal	to	
specific	regional	and	global	audiences,	particularly	in	Moscow,	Washington,	and	
at	the	United	Nations.	At	the	BBC,	its	broadcast	response	to	the	uprising	was	
fundamentally	shaped	by	monitored	material,	indicating	a	feedback	loop	between	
the	listening	capacities	of	open	source	communications	intelligence	and	the	
editorial	agenda	and	product	of	broadcasters.		
	
The	real-time	character	of	the	transcripts	also	reveal,	on	one	hand,	the	nuanced	
accretion	of	the	everyday	alongside,	on	the	other,	the	atomisation	of	the	
extraordinary.	Yet,	as	with	most	historical	documents,	these	are	not	objective	
accounts,	and	require	careful	handling	and	interpretation.	Variability	in	the	
technical	proficiency	of	the	monitoring	operation,	the	skills,	insights	and	
prejudices	of	monitors,	and	the	reliability	of	the	originating	broadcast	material	all	
weigh	heavily	on	the	significance	and	credibility	of	monitoring	as	a	historical	
source.	Nonetheless,	as	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	Transcription	Collection	
demonstrates,	the	opportunity	to	“listen	in”	to	the	mediated	experience	of	the	
past	is	a	compelling	analytical	tool.		
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Moreover,	the	transcripts	offer	an	inherently	interdisciplinary	approach	to	
understanding	recent	history	from	a	number	of	simultaneous	perspectives	and	
scales	of	enquiry:	from	the	granular	to	the	global.	Grand	diplomatic	narratives,	
for	example,	are	interwoven	with	sociological,	geographic,	economic	and	
scientific	insights.	Throughout,	one	is	left	with	a	very	strong	sense	of	how	and	
why	words	matter.	In	broadcasting,	as	in	our	own	lives,	words	are	not	simply	a	
substitute	for	other	actions:	they	enact	themselves.	Accordingly,	the	Collection,	
with	its	fifteen	million	pages	of	words,	is	a	treasure-trove	of	information	with	the	
potential	to	fill	an	evidential	gap	in	our	understanding	of	the	multi-faceted	
relationship	between	mass	communications	and	the	societies	they	serve.		
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historical	context,	see:	Hendy,	David.	Noise:	A	Human	History	of	Sound	&	
Listening,	London:	Profile,	2013	
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vii	Ibid.,	11:09	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
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ix	Andrew,	Christopher.	The	Defence	of	the	Realm:	The	Authorized	History	of	MI5.	
London:	Allen	Lane,	2009,	p.329;	Hughes,	Rosaleen.	‘Attention!	Moscow	Calling:	
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War	Museum.	Accessed	8	March	2018.	
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xxi	WAC,	R1/82/1,	G34/46,	‘Monitoring	Service’,	Note	by	the	BBC,	5	April	1946.		
xxii	WAC,	R1/85/1,	G5,	“Report	by	Director	of	Overseas	Services:	November	12th	
1948	to	January	20th	1949’,	12	January	1949.	
	 17	
																																																																																																																																																														
xxiii	The	traces	of	this	relationship	can	be	found	in	the	BBC	Monitoring	Service	
Transcription	Collection.	Where,	for	example,	it	is	noted	that	‘amplification’	has	
been	requested,	it	means	FBIS	have	a	particular	interest	in	obtaining	more	
information	about	a	specific	broadcast.	
xxiv	WAC,	Programme	as	Broadcast	(PasB),	‘The	BBC	and	the	Hungarian	
Revolution’,	23	January	1957.	
xxv	Ibid.		
xxvi	United	Nations,	Report	of	the	Special	Committee	on	the	Problem	of	Hungary,	
General	Assembly	Official	Records:	Eleventh	Session,	Supplement	No.18	
(A/3592),	1957.	
xxvii	WAC,	E40/151/1,	Rumblings	in	Hungary,	General	News	Talk	by	F.G.Rentoul,	
30	June	1956.	
xxviii	BMSTC,	L139	Hungary	(Home)	Budapest,	6:00am	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxix	Ibid.,	14:00	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxx	Ibid.,	19:00	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxxi	Ibid.	
xxxii	Mikes,	George.	The	Hungarian	Revolution,	London:	Andre	Deutsch,	1957,	
p.80.	
xxxiii	A	clearer	version	of	this	document	will	be	made	available	for	publication.	
xxxiv	BMSTC,	L139,	Note	on	the	behaviour	of	Radio	Budapest,	9:30am	(GMT),	24	
October	1956.	
xxxv	Ibid.,	Hungary	(Home)	Budapest,	4:25am	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxxvi	Ibid.,	4:53am	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxxvii	Ibid.,	7:45am	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxxviii	Ibid.,	8:00	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xxxix	Ibid.,	‘Note	on	the	behaviour	of	Radio	Budapest	on	24th	October	1956	from	
0930	GMT	onwards’.	
xl	Ibid.,	Hungary	(Home)	Budapest,	16:48pm	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xli	Ibid.,	13:12pm	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xlii	Ibid.,	17:48	(GMT),	24	October	1956.	
xliii	BMSTC,	L140	Hungary	(Home)	Budapest,	14:06pm	(GMT),	30	October	1956.	
xliv	Rawnsley,	Gary.	Radio	Diplomacy	and	Propaganda:	The	BBC	and	VOA	in	
International	Politics,	1956-64,	Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1996,	p.95;	Cartledge,	
Bryan.	The	Will	to	Survive:	A	History	of	Hungary,	Tiverton:	Timewell	Press,	2006,	
p.474.	
xlv	BMSTC,	L140	Hungary	(Home)	Budapest,	4:19am	(GMT),	4	November	1956.	
xlvi	Ibid.,	5:08am	(GMT),	4	November	1956.	
xlvii	Ibid.,	5:44	(GMT),	4	November	1956.	
xlviii	Ibid.,	6:12	(GMT),	4	November	1956.	
xlix	Ibid.,	6:56	(GMT),	4	November	1956.	
l	Ibid.,	10:00	(GMT),	4	November	1956.	
	
	
Bibliography	
	
	
Andrew,	Christopher.	The	Defence	of	the	Realm:	The	Authorized	History	of	MI5.	
London:	Allen	Lane,	2009.	
	 18	
																																																																																																																																																														
Applebaum,	Anne.	Iron	Curtain:	The	Crushing	of	Eastern	Europe,	1944-56.	
London:	Allen	Lane,	2012.	
BBC	Monitoring	Service	Transcription	Collection	(BMSTC),	BBC	Monitoring	
Service,	Caversham,	Berkshire.	
Bekes,	Csaba.,	Byrne,	Malcolm.	&	Rainer,	Janos	(eds.).	The	Hungarian	Revolution:	
A	History	in	Documents.	Budapest:	Central	European	University	Press,	2002.		
Briggs,	Asa.	The	History	of	Broadcasting	in	the	United	Kingdom,	Volume	II:	The	
Golden	Age	of	Wireless,	1927-1939,	Oxford:	OUP,	1995.	
Briggs,	Asa.	The	History	of	Broadcasting	in	the	United	Kingdom,	Volume	III:	The	
War	of	Words,	Oxford:	OUP,	1995	
Cartledge,	Bryan.	The	Will	to	Survive:	A	History	of	Hungary,	Tiverton:	Timewell	
Press,	2006	
Cull,	Nicholas.	The	Cold	War	and	the	United	States	Information	Agency:	American	
Propaganda	and	Public	Diplomacy.	Cambridge:	CUP,	2008.	
Gati,	Charles.	Failed	Illusions:	Moscow,	Washington,	Budapest,	and	the	1956	
Hungarian	Revolt.	Washington:	Woodrow	Wilson	Center	Press,	2006.	
Hendy,	David.	Noise:	A	Human	History	of	Sound	&	Listening,	London:	Profile,	
2013.	
Hennessy,	Peter.	Having	it	so	Good:	Britain	in	the	Fifties.	London:	Allen	Lane,	
2006.	
Hitchcock,	Tim.	‘Big	Data,	Small	Data	and	Meaning’,	Histrionics.	Accessed	20	
March	2018.	http://historyonics.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/big-data-small-
data-and-meaning_9.html	
Hobsbawm,	Eric.	‘Could	it	have	been	different?’	London	Review	of	Books	28(22),	
16	November	2006.	
Hughes,	Rosaleen.	‘Attention!	Moscow	Calling:	BBC	Monitoring	and	the	Cuban	
Missile	Crisis’,	Listening	to	the	World,	Imperial	War	Museum.	Accessed	8	
March	2018.	
https://www.iwm.org.uk/sites/default/files/images/gallery/Attention%21
%20Moscow%20Calling%20BBC%20Monitoring%20and%20the%20Cuban
%20Missile%20Crisis%20-%20Rosaleen%20Hughes.pdf	
Johnson,	A.	Ross.	Radio	Free	Europe	and	Radio	Liberty:	The	CIA	Years	and	Beyond.	
Washington:	Woodrow	Wilson	Center	Press,	2010.	
Johnson,	A.	Ross.	‘To	Monitor	and	be	Monitored	–	Radio	Free	Europe	and	Radio	
Liberty	during	the	Cold	War’,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Occasional	
Paper,	Wilson	Center,	2017,	pp.1-13:	
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/to-monitor-and-be-monitored-
radio-free-europe-and-radio-liberty-during-the-cold-war		
Judt,	Tony.	Postwar:	A	History	of	Europe	since	1945.	London:	Heinemann,	2005.	
Leetaru,	Kalev.	‘The	Scope	of	FBIS	and	BBC	Open-Source	Media	Coverage,	1979-
2008’,	Studies	in	Intelligence,	vol.54,	no.1	(Extracts,	March	2010),	pp.17-37.		
Mikes,	George.	The	Hungarian	Revolution,	London:	Andre	Deutsch,	1957.	
Rawnsley,	Gary.	Radio	Diplomacy	and	Propaganda:	The	BBC	and	VOA	in	
International	Politics,	1956-64,	Basingstoke:	Macmillan,	1996.	
Renier,	Olive	&	Rubinstein,	Vladimir.	Assigned	to	Listen:	The	Evesham	Experience,	
1939-43,	London:	BBC	External	Services,	1986.	
Seaton,	Jean	&	Hughes,	Rosaleen.	‘The	BBC	and	the	Cuban	missile	crisis:	private	
worlds	and	public	service’,	in	Gioe,	David.,	Scott,	Len.,	Andrew,	Christoper	
	 19	
																																																																																																																																																														
(eds.).	An	International	History	of	the	Cuban	Missile	Crisis:	A	50-year	
retrospective,	London:	Routledge,	2013.	
United	Nations,	Report	of	the	Special	Committee	on	the	Problem	of	Hungary,	
General	Assembly	Official	Records:	Eleventh	Session,	Supplement	No.18	
(A/3592),	1957.	
Webb,	Alban.	‘Cold	War	Radio	and	the	Hungarian	Uprising,	1956’,	Cold	War	
History,	13(2),	pp.221-238.	
Webb,	Alban.	London	Calling:	Britain,	the	BBC	World	Service	and	the	Cold	War,	
London:	Bloomsbury,	2014.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
©	Alban	Webb	
2019	
